2024 was noteworthy for public debates and discussions on domestic socio-economic developments – at a time when the leadership in Beijing was trying to instill and project confidence at home and abroad. Throughout 2024, high-level party and state meetings issued a steady stream of policy buzzwords and initiatives. The annual National People’s Congress and the twice-a-decade Third Plenum of the Central Committee in July were framed around the themes of reform and modernization, with promises of higher quality economic growth, jobs, and social policy that spoke to public expectations.
The Central Economic Work Conference in December focused on measures to stimulate consumption. A host of policy measures to restabilize private sector development and the real estate market were enacted throughout the year, albeit with limited effect. The State Council and government departments released policy blueprints for pension reform, new family policy measures and for a loosening of China’s hukou, the country’s household registration system that controls internal migration and access to social benefits. All of these measures had long been called for by policy experts – in some cases for over a decade.
Yet expert and public reactions point to shortcomings of recent policy actions. Debates show public confidence in the economy and job market have not recovered. Censorship around topics such as the state of the economy is an important indicator for key policy challenges China’s leadership faces. Gaps between official narratives and expert and citizen voices showcase citizens’ concerns, perceived failings of state policy and even the potential for social unrest. More proactive policies will be needed – a topic to watch in 2025.
Economic woes remain front and center
Ahead of the 2024 Third Plenum, experts capitalized on the perceived space for debate. They voiced concerns and diverging views on the best measures to revitalize the business environment: stronger state guidance and collaboration between private and state-owned enterprises, or structural reforms for fair competition and a more predictable business environment and legal framework.
Harsher criticism of recent economic challenges remained a red line, however. One recent example are the speeches and transcripts of two economists, Gao Shanwen and Fu Peng, both chief economists at securities brokerages, regarding the bleak labor market situation, which went viral in December 2024 and were erased almost in real time as people forwarded them.6 Even critical articles written by well-known economists many years ago have quickly disappeared after being re-posted. Censors do not stop with information shared in the public domain. Zhu Hengpeng, deputy director at the Institute of Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, was placed under investigation for comments made in private WeChat chat groups that were critical of Xi Jinping and the government’s economic policies.7
Skepticism about the positive official messaging is not limited to just a few experts. In summer 2024, the phrase “garbage time of history” (历史的垃圾时间) reemerged as an internet buzzword. Along with older phrases like “lying flat” or “involution,” it is used to express dwindling optimism about the future. Responses to this term show government intervention isn’t limited to censorship. Articles quickly appeared by experts toeing the party line, criticizing the phrase and people using it. But continuous online debates about high youth unemployment and people sharing experiences about the difficulty of finding stable and properly paid jobs highlight the underlying challenges of these online catchphrases.
The state of local government finances is another source of unease. Netizens have been quick to circulate local government documents containing the phrase “smashing pots and selling iron” (砸锅卖铁). This refers to the liquidation of publicly owned assets to avoid local debt defaults and the establishment of new task forces to clear the balance sheet in some localities. Similarly, Chinese media reports and online forums exposed a nationwide pattern of cash-strapped local governments targeting small private companies with arbitrary compliance investigations and hefty fines as a way to raise funds. Censors intervened to curtail some of the criticism – but the government also responded with debt relief measures and a new guideline by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) forbidding “profit-driven inspections.”8
Social policy progress falls short of public expectations
For the first time in over 70 years, lawmakers raised the country’s famously low retirement age in a bid to reduce the country’s looming pension deficit. Although there will be a gradual adjustment to new pension age brackets of 55-63 years (depending on gender and profession), the measure has been hotly contested, especially the requirement to pay into the system for 20 years to qualify. Older workers fear being pushed out of their jobs by the vast number of unemployed young people, while younger Chinese say raising the retirement age would block their opportunities. All share worries about the lack of well-paid jobs to build up pension benefits.
The State Council’s new birth and family support measures to encourage more babies were lauded by state media and experts as a key policy step in easing the pressure of demographic change. But here, too, it is not clear if the new measures will ease the work and financial pressures on prospective parents amid current job and economic anxieties. Online debates also reflect changing social attitudes, especially among women. After decades of birth restrictions, the pro-family shift has triggered some consternation after reports that local authorities had called women to ask if they were pregnant or planning to have children.9
Reforms of the hukou household registration system, too, have been discussed and announced for many years. Despite gradual changes, the system still is a key cause of structural inequalities between people from rural and urban areas, as it restricts access to social security and school education. At the National People’s Congress (NPC), the government vowed to “ensure that all rural migrant workers in cities can obtain permanent urban residency if they so desire” and that “urban residents without local household registration enjoy equal access to basic public services.”10
The government’s ability – or lack thereof – to provide opportunities, care, and security for its citizens is set to become a stronger focus of public attention. In 2024, China saw a series of violent attacks in different parts of the country, killing and wounding a number of people – three incidents alone in November. In Zhuhai, for example, a man killed 35 people by driving a car into a sports center. Citizens and news outlets have questioned the reasons for the incidents, dubbed “revenge on society attacks” (报复社会), especially the underlying social pressures.
With over 19 reported attacks, leaving 63 dead and 166 injured, even China’s party and state leader Xi Jinping responded, highlighting the need for “social stability measures,” “strengthening prevention measures,” and the control of risks “at the local source.”11 Local police and neighborhood cadres were instructed to be on the lookout for people who may pose a risk, such as those without a spouse or children, a job, stable income, financial assets or normal social interactions. They should also watch for those who have experienced any of “five frustrations”: failed investments, estranged relationships, feelings of being marginalized, loss of emotional equilibrium, or mental illness.12
Despite heavy censorship, people online questioned the effectiveness of the measures and expressed concerns over excessive surveillance that may inadvertently target less-privileged citizens at a time when many are experiencing economic stress. The public perception of these attacks reflect an underlying concern over social grievances and structural inequalities – both social and regional – that will require policy attention, not just more surveillance and political control.
The party sees political risk even in youthful revelry
While terms such as “lying flat” – opting out of the rat race and being content with the bare minimum – are indicators of a shifting mindset among some young Chinese, most are concerned with finding secure jobs and career opportunities. But like young people everywhere, they seek out online spaces to express their aspirations and frustrations and to amuse themselves in activities with their peers. In recent years, authorities have shown through crackdowns both on and off social media just how sensitive they are – even to benign youthful activities, which they fear could hold the seeds of political discontent. Authorities met planned Halloween celebrations in Shanghai and elsewhere in October 2024 with a heavy police presence and zero-fun attitude.
Social media posts documented the police in nightlife areas in Shanghai even before the actual day and showed them questioning partygoers in costume. This oversensitivity was sparked by the 2023 Halloween celebration where young people used costumes to express social and even political discontent about recent harsh Covid policies and gloomy economic prospects. In the leadership’s memory, the 2022 “White Paper” protests that erupted in different parts of the country still loom large, even if authorities have largely erased evidence and references to the events from public debate. Mainly directed against arbitrary Covid restrictions, some protesters had called for an end of censorship, democracy, rule of law and Xi Jinping’s removal from power.13
The element of fear helps explain why a similar dynamic was at play in the government’s response to night-cycling trips from Zhengzhou to Kaifeng in November 2024. Started by a small group of students, the bike rides grew into a mass event with more than 100,000 cyclists. While local authorities initially encouraged the rides, viewing it as a way to boost tourism consumption, they quickly grew concerned about their size, and reacted by blocking bike lanes, geo-blocking bike-sharing apps and requiring passes for students to leave campus. On social media, viral videos of nightly travels gave way to media discussions about the harmfulness of such mass events – and student reports about restrictions.14
